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Abstract 
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(Massive Online Open Courses) platforms. We then discuss how the private provision of MOOCs, seen 
as pure public goods, can be sustained. Based on the theory of multisided platforms, we analyse five 
ways to monetize the MOOC business. Our conclusion is that the most sustainable approach is what we 
call the ‘subcontractor model’, flavored by touches of the other four models. We then claim that MOOC 
platforms can play a key transformative role in the higher education sector by making teaching practices 
evolve, rather than by replacing incumbent institutions. Finally, we derive a number of directions for 
public policy: governments should act to foster the cooperation between MOOC platforms and other 
higher education institutions, so as to improve the benefits that can arise from these technological 
innovations; a particular focus should also be given to professors in order to encourage them to innovate 
in their teaching practices. 
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1. Introduction
The year 2012 saw the emergence of a new player in the higher educa-
tion landscape: MOOC platforms (which stands for “Massive Open Online
Courses”). Following the decision of two Stanford professors, Peter Norvig
and Sebastian Thrun, to put online and for free their ‘Introduction to arti-
ficial intelligence’ class, more than 160.000 students from all over the world
enrolled and 23.000 received a certificate of course completion. Following
this massive success, several private initiatives started to establish online
platforms to organize these courses. Sebastian Thrun went on to create
Udacity, a website that could provide other courses than his own. Andrew
Ng and Daphne Koller, two other Stanford professors, founded Coursera
while MIT and Harvard University jointly created edX.1 The success was
almost immediate and MOOCs quickly became a buzzword in the sector of
online distance education, which was not used to be in the spotlights.2 For
example, as of early 2014, Coursera partnered with 108 institutions from all
over the world, the vast majority of which being traditional higher education
institutions, to provide more than 500 courses, which have attracted more
than 7 million single users. In less than two years, Coursera also succeeded
in attracting more than $65 million in venture capital investment.
From an economic point of view, MOOCs differ from traditional higher
education initiatives by having the potential to be a true public good, i.e.,
to exhibit both nonrivalness and nonexcludability. Nonrivalness is an in-
herent property of higher education in general: the ‘consumption’ of some
education program by an individual does not reduce the ‘consumption’ pos-
sibilities of the same program for other individuals. Excludability (i.e., the
capacity to exclude someone from consuming the good in question), how-
ever, depends on technological and organizational factors. It is in terms of
technology that the difference is the most pronounced: by relying on the
Internet and digital technologies, MOOC platforms manage to considerably
loosen–if not eliminate–the capacity constraints that curb the provision of
traditional higher education programs. As a result, MOOC platforms are
able to attract hundred thousands students per course, and the marginal
cost of teaching an extra student comes close to zero. A difference with tra-
ditional higher education also exists from an organizational point of view.
As the second ‘O’ in the MOOC acronym attests to it, MOOCs are (at least
for now) truly open: their access is free of charge and no other form of ex-
clusion (e.g., contractual) is imposed. It is thus fair to state that contrary
to traditional higher education programs, MOOCs are nonexcludable.
Nonexcludability has pros and cons from a social point of view. On the
plus side, an enhanced access to courses magnifies the positive externalities
of education for society as a whole. On the minus side, private provision of
1Udemy, Futurelearn, FUN and Iversity are other lesser known examples of MOOC
platforms.
2The New-York Times declared 2012 as the “Year of the MOOCs”.
AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF MOOCS 3
a nonexcludable good is typically problematic as no revenues can be raised
from the sales of the good (as non payers cannot be excluded). Despite
the latter difficulty, MOOCs are currently provided by private platforms
with no (or very limited) public funding. How is this possible? Is such
organization only temporary or can it be sustained in the long run? These
are the questions that we aim to address in this article. For this purpose,
we will describe the economic and pedagogical characteristics of MOOCs as
highlighted by the scientific literature. We will argue that the peculiarity
of their business model is that they are organized as multisided platforms.
Using this framework, we will discuss the various ways that could be used
to make revenues from providing free courses. Based on this argumentation,
we will conclude that MOOC platforms will most likely complement rather
than substitute the traditional system.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
characteristics of MOOC platforms and how they set them apart from tra-
ditional higher education institutions. Section 3 studies the various ways in
which these platforms can monetize their business. Section 4 and 5 discuss
the implications for, respectively, traditional higher education institutions
and public policies. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Characteristics of Massive Open Online Courses platforms
We start this section by stressing the novelty aspects of MOOCs com-
pared to earlier distance learning initiatives. We then propose a taxonomy
of MOOCs and briefly describe their value-added in terms of learning. We
close this section by emphasizing two economic characteristics of MOOCs
and of the platforms on which they are delivered.
2.1. Novelty of MOOCs. MOOCs are not the first attempt in online dis-
tance learning in the higher education sector. However, compared to pre-
vious initiatives, they have three distinct peculiarities that were not jointly
observed before, which clearly set them apart from other forms of online
education.
The first characteristic relates to the first “O” of its acronym and how
platforms define openness. Learners can follow MOOCs at a zero cost and
there is no barrier of entry such as a pre-requirement, an entry exam or
any other form of selection. This can be seen as a form of commitment
by the platform to offer a non-excludable service. However, this peculiarity
is not new in the online higher education landscape. This openness, for
example, was already present in OpenCourseWare, which are videotaped
lessons provided at some universities (the MIT OpenCourseWare being the
most well known) and available for free on the Internet (OECD, 2007).
The second characteristic is that learners can receive a certificate of com-
pletion that proves that they have reached a minimum level of understanding
4 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND JULIEN JACQMIN
of the course material.3 This is possible thanks to the various tests organized
throughout the courses. Opencourseware did not allow for this but a certi-
fication was already available for courses provided by for-profit universities
(mainly in the U.S.) and by Open Universities active in several countries.
For-profit universities now attract more than 10% of the U.S. population by
providing a mix of live and online classes to their students (Breneham et al.,
2006). Their online classes are mainly used as a way to cut their costs of
providing education. Open universities have been established in the second
half of the last century as a way to ease the access to higher education to
more learners with correspondence courses. Since the end of the nineties,
they have also embraced Internet as a medium to provide their courses.
Hence, both these institutions were granting certification for the completion
of their courses long before the advent of MOOCs platforms.
The third characteristic concerns the presence of interactions between
the learners and the platform and between the students themselves. These
online interactions aim to emulate the live interactions taking place in the
traditional, face-to-face, higher education. The interactions with the plat-
forms take the form of automatically graded quizzes and essays. These are
an attempt to circumvent the quasi absence of direct interactions between
the professors and the students. They are possible thanks to the artificial
intelligence programs developed by the platforms. The interactions between
students are trying to reproduce peer effects online. They take place on
forum, throughout online group projects or peer grading assessments. As
we will discuss later, this characteristic offers a lot of room for innovation
in order to improve the functioning of the platform and student’s learning
outcomes. These interactions are similar to the ones that are made possible
via learning management systems, such as Moodle or Blackboard that are
often used to complement traditional courses.
2.2. A taxonomy. Within the MOOC community, practices are far from
being homogenous (U.K. Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2013,
and Gaebel, 2013) and tend to be located somewhere in between two ap-
proaches. The first approach is referred to as xMOOCs. It puts more em-
phasis on the automatic interactions between the platform and the students.
The second is referred to as cMOOCs where ‘c’ stands for ‘connectivist’.
This approach puts more emphasis on the interactions among students, to
the point where the content of the course emerges, at least partially, from
these interactions. There, the role of the professor is not to provide content
but to facilitate the student’s learning experience.
In this work, we are mainly interested in understanding MOOCs provided
near the xMOOCs side of the pedagogical spectrum. There are several rea-
sons why we focus on this type. First, cMOOCs are, for now, at a more
3Up to now, these certificates can only be used as credits in very limited circumstances.
At the time of this writing, we do not know of any MOOC accredited by an external
accrediting body.
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experimental stage and no empirical studies have examined their contribu-
tions on the students’ learning outcomes. Secondly, as xMOOCs are focused
on the transmission of knowledge, like traditional higher education institu-
tions, they are more likely to affect the higher education system in one way
or another. Finally, whereas cMOOCs tend to be the result of a bilateral
relationship between a professor and students, xMOOCS are now essentially
organized around multilateral platforms that are accessible to a large num-
ber of content providers (i.e., professors); such mode of organization raises
new and important economic issues that are worth examining in detail.
2.3. Benefits for learners. What is the added value offered by MOOCs
to learners compared with a face-to-face approach, as provided in the higher
education sector? Aside from its flexibility and accessibility that were al-
ready possible with the famous invention of Gutenberg, we can classify their
added value in three categories of advantages.4
First, MOOCs facilitate the implementation of a retrieval-based learning
by providing feedbacks to the students using automatically graded tests and
quizzes. According to this cognitive theory, these tests are not only a way
to measure or assess what a student knows. Retrieving information has not
only an impact on the students’ short term memory but it also improves their
long term memory. Many works have tested this hypothesis in a laboratory
setting (see, e.g., Roediger and Karpicke, 2006, and Karpicke and Roediger,
2008). They have found a positive and significant relationship between the
practice of retrieval and learning outcomes. Recently, Pennebaker et al.
(2013) have also found a similar relationship in a study based on the use of
retrieval tools during a full term course.
Secondly, because MOOCs are delivered on the Internet, they have the
potential to facilitate the implementation of a student-centered learning ex-
perience. As discussed more generally for Internet markets in Levin (2011),
this customization is possible thanks to the low cost of adapting the content
provided to the students and the ability to utilize the data available on the
platform. In the context of MOOCs, the Internet facilitates the implementa-
tion of a mastery learning environment thanks to the use of tests and possible
remedial systems (Bloom, 1984). According to this approach, learning out-
comes are improved and less heterogeneous when students go on to more
advanced learning tasks only if they have shown a sufficient mastery of the
previous learning units. MOOC platforms can, in addition to provide a more
adapted content, offer a learning environment more adapted to the cognitive
peculiarities of learners. For example, classes can be watched, re-watched
and stopped at any time depending on the student’s attention capacity. A
multiple representation of the content (made possible by the simultaneously
provision of videos, quizzes, syllabus, or discussions on forums) is also seen
as affecting learning outcomes positively (Ainsworth, 1999). Through their
enhanced multitasking skills (as acknowledged by Carrier et al., 2009), the
4See also Glance et al. (2013) for a discussion along the same lines.
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younger generations may take even more advantage of this possibility. Even
if MOOCs are not yet ripe in implementing this personalization of the learn-
ing experience, the Internet provides the right conditions to move into this
direction.
The third advantage concerns the implementation of evidence-based ed-
ucational practices, which can be more easily implemented than in a tra-
ditional higher education environment. The main difficulty with such an
approach is to distinguish between correlation and causality when consider-
ing an educational practice and the chosen learning outcome.5 This difficulty
follows from the existence of an endogeneity bias caused by the presence of
inverse causality or by the omission of a variable that affects both the ana-
lyzed practice and the corresponding outcome. By separating the treatment
and control groups in a purely random way on a large number of individuals,
controlled trial experiments allow the analyst to disentangle the causal im-
pact by looking at how the learning outcomes differ depending on the group
considered. These conclusions can then give room for further improvements
in terms of learning outcomes on the MOOC platforms.
There are several reasons why MOOC platforms offer a great environment
for random trial experiments. Thanks to the massive amount of data con-
cerning the learning process and the outcomes available at a very low cost,
the Internet gives a perfect setting for this type of experiments (Levin, 2011).
Such experiments are also technically and administratively easier to put in
place than in a traditional higher education setting (where, e.g., review
board might impair the randomization process based on ethical grounds).
The Hawthorne effect (i.e., the learners change their behavior when they
know that they are observed as subjects of an experiment) and the repli-
cation of results are also less of an issue in this context. Finally, spillovers
from the treatment to the control group can be avoided by separating the
two groups completely. This can be done by offering completely separate
courses in parallel on the platform.
Up to now, applications of this methodology in the context of online
learning have been parsimonious, Figlio et al. (2013) and Bowen et al.
(2014) being two exceptions. Figlio et al. (2013) have analyzed how a live
course fares compared with the same course taught online in an introductory
class of a research university. They have observed on average a similar
impact on the students’ achievement. However, online classes were leading
to a lower outcome for low achieving students. Bowen et al. (2014) have
studied how students following a class in a traditional format (taught in an
auditorium) and a hybrid format (taught online with face-to-face instruction
time) fare. They have found that students from these two groups end up
with similar learning outcomes.
5See Schlotter et al. (2011) and Bouguen and Gurgand (2012) for a discussion on this
topic.
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Despite these first encouraging results, MOOCs, in a stand-alone format,
are far from reaching similar learning outcomes than traditional courses.
Platforms are still not close to replicate online the interactions taking place
in the traditional higher education sector. They also lag behind in terms of
coherence between courses compared with the ones offered in a traditional
higher education program. However, the difference in learning outcomes be-
tween MOOCs and traditional courses is likely to diminish. New technolo-
gies facilitating interactions with the platform and among students and the
emergence of evidence-based pedagogical practices will facilitate this evolu-
tion. Moreover, this sector shows a much greater flexibility than traditional
higher education sector, which should further speed up the process.
2.4. Economic specificities. We emphasize now two important specifici-
ties of MOOCs. On the one hand, MOOCs differ from traditional courses
both on the supply- and on the demand-side, with potential effects on the
market structure of higher education. On the other hand, the choice of or-
ganizational mode (for or not for profit) seems to have a larger impact on
MOOC platforms than on traditional higher education institutions.
2.4.1. Supply, demand and market structure. On the supply side, MOOC
platforms stand out compared to traditional higher education institutions.
Their cost structure is dominated by comparatively larger fixed costs.6 These
costs have to be incurred even before the course starts. They concern the
development of the platform, the investment in a sufficiently large band-
width and the online adaptation of the course. The latter category can
vary depending on the material used (e.g., to record the classes) and the
use of external help (like a cartoonist, a video editor or teaching assistants).
The (opportunity) cost of the person providing the course is also larger.7 A
MOOC requires more time than a normal class because the contents need
to be adapted to this new format and because supervising the teaching as-
sistants and the external technical help entails larger coordination costs.
On the other hand, variable costs are much smaller. Interactions between
students and professors are now replaced by interactions with the platform
(to grade quizzes) and by interactions among peers (to crowdsource the
questions that students might have and to evaluate their peers). Thanks to
this, if the platform is well organized and there is no issue due to congestion,
variable costs are close to zero. Furthermore, there is no capacity limit as
is the case for a normal course (where, e.g., teaching rooms cannot be ex-
panded). MOOCs face the additional advantage that they could also, unless
part of the contents depreciates, be reused at zero cost by the platform.
Hence, MOOCs are a non-rival service in their use. Compared to their live
6See Hollands and Tirthali (2014) for suggestive evidences on the cost of MOOCs.
7Udacity pays professors to teach on its platform, while Coursera or edX do not, as
professors are still on the payroll of their respective university (it is the choice of their
host institution to provide them with incentives to teach a MOOC).
8 PAUL BELLEFLAMME AND JULIEN JACQMIN
counterparts, they have an undeniable advantage in terms of economies of
scale.8
On the demand side, MOOCs improve the accessibility of higher educa-
tion: classes can be followed at any time, there is no transportation cost, no
need to move in to live near a campus or to commute. They are generally
free of charge. Students can also decide the courses that they want to follow
without having to stick to a specific sequence. In addition, as we discuss it
in Section 3.1, MOOC platforms generate indirect network effects between
the professors providing content and the students following the course. Pro-
fessors prefer to teach a MOOC on a platform that attracts more students
and students prefer to join a platform offering more courses.9
Because economies of scale and network effects are two reinforcing forces,
their combined presence may lead to a concentration of the market for
MOOC platforms. This leads some observers to predict that, like Ama-
zon, Google or eBay in their respective markets, a single platform will dom-
inate the MOOC market.10 Countervailing forces, as discussed by Evans
and Schmalensee (2007), are the differentiation among platforms (e.g., from
a pedagogical, linguistic or technological point of view or in terms of the
objective pursued by the platform), the possibility for participants to ‘mul-
tihome’ (i.e., to participate simultaneously to several platforms) or the rise
of some form of congestion in the use of the platform.11
2.4.2. For-profit vs. not-for-profit. Platforms active in the MOOC market
tend to differ in the way they are organized. Udemy, Coursera and Udacity
are organized as for-profit institutions while edX is organized as a not-for-
profit institution. The main difference between these two forms of organi-
zation is that not-for-profit institutions are barred from distributing their
profits to their owners.12 Any budget surplus must be reinvested into the
8The empirical literature (see Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) for a review) has found no con-
sensus on the exact level of economies of scale in traditional higher education institutions.
Both increasing and decreasing returns to scale were found. Returns to scale tend to be
relatively lower for undergraduate and scientific programs. Explanations for these results
have to do with the level of interpersonal relation in teaching, the size of fixed assets
(such as laboratories, libraries, classes or computer classrooms), and congestion problems
related to large bureaucratic institutions.
9Although such demand-side economies of scale are also present in the higher education
system, their role is greatly undermined by the presence of relatively important (supply-
side) diseconomies of scale.
10See ‘The attack of the MOOCs’, The Economist, 20/07/2013.
11A high degree of market concentration could have a non-negligible impact on the
professor’s wage distribution by leading to a superstar phenomenon, as observed in the
entertainment industry. See Acemoglu et al. (2014) for a formalization of this phenomenon
in a setting where less skilled professors use the digital content produced by relatively more
skilled professors to complement their courses.
12The difference goes even further as they do not have any proper owner.
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institution. Following the arguments of Hansman (1980), there are pro’s
and con’s for these two modes of organization in the context of MOOCs.13
The major drawback of this legal constraint is that not-for-profit institu-
tions may find it difficult to access additional capital as they do not have
access to the equity market. In a start-up phase, their lack of collateral
makes it difficult for them to raise capital via debt financing. Without large
amounts of capital coming from customers (as these online businesses are
not monetized yet), the lack of access to flexible capital makes it difficult to
attain the critical mass needed to take advantage of the presence of indirect
network effects and economies of scale. This problem could be circumvented,
at least partially, by increase in capital coming from donations; yet, dona-
tions may be hard to attract and donors may impose a number of restrictions
as to how funds can be used.
On the other hand, the impossibility to distribute profits plays a commit-
ment role in the provision of an education of quality. Education is a credence
good, i.e., even after its consumption students can hardly ascertain its qual-
ity. This is the source of asymmetric information between students and the
providers of education. As it is also more costly to provide an education of
quality, the not-for-profit status gives an incentive not to shirk on the qual-
ity of education provided to students. It can also play a similar role towards
donors, who would rather see their money be invested in the causes pursued
by the institution than redistributed to the owners of the for-profit firm.
Hence, the not-for-profit status helps reduce the market failure created by
the presence of asymmetric information. In the context of MOOC platforms,
this problem can be partially alleviated by an external accreditation of the
quality of the courses or, as done by several platforms, by externalizing the
course development to a member of a recognized higher education institu-
tion, who would then indirectly and informally play a certification role for
quality.
Currently, MOOCs were established by funds coming from venture capi-
talists, universities and foundations. All these contributors are looking for
some form of return on their investment (in monetary terms for venture cap-
italists and, perhaps universities; in terms of achieving certain objectives for
foundations). Such a return is only possible if platforms are able to gener-
ate enough revenues to at least cover their costs. As is usually the case for
Internet start-ups, the monetization of their business is one of their main
challenge. This leads us to the question of the business models that MOOC
platforms can adopt.
3. Potential monetization strategies
A business model describes the main aspects of a firm both in terms of
objectives pursued and resources needed to achieve them. Not-for-profit and
13See also Hansman (2012) for an application of the argument to the context of higher
education.
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for-profit platforms aim to offer courses to a large number of students. The
resources are an adequate technology and a sufficient amount of recurring
revenues, at least to cover their costs. This last element is the most criti-
cal. We examine several ways to generate revenues in a sustainable manner.
Before that, we explain why MOOC platforms can be seen as multisided
platforms. This perspective will allow us to understand and assess the rel-
evance of the different business models that MOOC platforms may want to
adopt.
3.1. MOOC platforms as multisided platforms. The main function of
these platforms is to ease the interactions between several distinct groups of
agents (which are the ‘sides’ of the platform). Without the intermediation of
platform, interactions would take place less easily, or not at all. In addition
to this, there are indirect network effects as agents on one side of the platform
value the service provided on the platform in function of the importance of
the participation on the other sides. As formalized by Rochet and Tirole
(2003, 2006), in the context of two-sided markets, strategic pricing decisions
need to be based on a careful appraisal of the interrelations among different
sides (so-called “cross-side network effects”) and within each side (so-called
“within-side network effects”). It is then common to see asymmetric pricing
structure with one group of agents being subsidized (leading to free access,
or even negative prices) and other groups being charged higher prices. In
general, platforms have an incentive to charge lower prices to the group that
exerts the strongest cross-side effect on the other side(s): what is lost by
decreasing the price on this group is more than compensated by increasing
participation on that side, as well as on the other side(s) because of the
(positive) cross-side effects. By the same token, subsidizing the participation
on one side allows multisided platforms to solve the so-called “chicken-and-
egg” problem: as each group’s participation is conditioned on the other
group’s participation, the platform strategically chooses to let one group
use the platform for free so as to initiate a positive feedback loop. In the
context of MOOC platforms, this logic explains how the provision of a public
good by a private initiative can be sustainable, even without government
subsidies.
Four groups of agents are likely to gravitate around MOOC platforms. In
addition to students, professors and higher education institutions, MOOC
platforms may also attract other private actors, such as advertisers or em-
ployers. To understand the functions performed by the platform (and how
it can monetize them), we must first identify what each group expects from
the other groups and what they can give them in exchange.
3.1.1. Students. Students participate to the platform to follow courses taught
by professors. If their only motivation is to acquire new knowledge and com-
petences, their interactions stop here. But if their learning is motivated by
a will to improve their employability, students will also value the presence of
universities (as they guarantee, up to now only in an informal manner, the
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quality of the courses), employers (as students may signal their abilities to
them) and advertisers (if their presence and their payments allow platforms
to offer courses to students for free).
The role played by peer effects can also have its importance as, by observ-
ing the behavior of their peers, students might be influenced. As a result,
a student’s learning outcomes will depend on the interactions with his fel-
low students. This issue has been intensively studied in a traditional higher
education context as, depending on the nature of the peer effects, differ-
ent policies might prevail (see, e.g., Winston and Zimmerman (2004) for a
discussion on the issue). Studies in an online environment are scarce. Bet-
tinger et al. (2014) is one exception. Using data from a for-profit university
active online, they observe that peer effects do exist on forum as they im-
pact course completion and performance, and are persistent on subsequent
courses. Note also that the authors observe the existence of some form of
congestion as too many and too lengthy posts by other peers on the course
forum can have a negative impact on these outcome variables.14
3.1.2. Professors. Professors seek to disseminate their teaching materials
and to experiment with new pedagogies. Being involved with a MOOC al-
lows them to reach both objectives. If dissemination is the main objective,
professors clearly prefer platforms that attract large crowd of students. Pro-
fessors also value the fact that universities interact with the platform. First,
although professors can offer a course in their own name, they usually con-
tinue to depend on their respective university. There is often a direct link
as it is the university that pays professors to develop a MOOC (considering
that this task belongs to their academic missions). There are also a number
of indirect links. First, professors (even if they act free-lance) benefit from
the reputation of the university to which there are affiliated, as this repu-
tation facilitates the enrollment of students. Second, developing a MOOC
may help professors to improve their teaching portfolio so as to, e.g., in-
crease their chances to get a promotion in their university. This form of
reputational/career concerns is similar to the one described in Lerner and
Tirole (2002) for contributors to open source software. Finally, a success-
ful MOOC may increase the demand for complementary goods and services
(such as (text)books, invited seminars, guest lecturing) for which profes-
sors can be financially compensated. Regarding the other private actors,
professors value their presence indirectly if it contributes to attract more
students.
3.1.3. Universities. As discussed by Hollands and Tirthali (2014), higher
education institutions can decide to invest money and time in a MOOC plat-
form for several reasons. First and foremost, developing MOOCs allow them
to extend the reach and access of their teaching activities. Thereby, they
14If this congestion in the peer effects is also present in the MOOC setting, this negative
impact on the benefits derived by students may potentially undermine the economies of
scale of MOOC platforms.
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may not only build and maintain a strong brand (by advertising themselves
as innovative institutions), but also collect additional revenues. Clearly,
in view of these objectives, universities tend to favor platforms that are
able to attract a large and diversified crowd of students. MOOCs also help
universities to improve learning outcomes thanks to new pedagogical inno-
vations. To attain this goal, they pay professors and encourage them via
other non-monetary rewards (courses buy-outs, promotions, etc.) to adapt
their courses and to carry on research about new pedagogical approaches.
Similarly to professors, universities only value indirectly the participation of
private actors to the platform.
3.1.4. Private actors. Private actors are mainly willing to interact with stu-
dents. On the one hand, employers gain access, via a MOOC platform, to a
large pool of students as well as to detailed data about their skills; the larger
the pool of students and the higher the quality of the data about them, the
higher the chances for employers to find the desired profiles. Employers
may also see MOOCs as a flexible and cheap tool to train their staff. In
this respect, the presence of universities and renowned professors is highly
valued. On the other hand, advertisers are ready to pay to have access to
the visitors of the platform, as well as information about them. This infor-
mation allows advertisers to segment the audience and to customize their
commercials, so as to attract more clicks on their ads, and hopefully more
sales as a consequence.
Now that we have described how MOOC platforms create value by facili-
tating the interaction between different groups of stakeholders, we describe
five business models, which can be seen as five different ways to monetize
the value that platforms create.15
3.2. Certification model. The certification model has been the model
that traditional higher education institutions have been following for decades.
By certifying the successful completion of an educational program, the de-
gree signals to the job market the skills acquired by students. As long as
employers value such signal (e.g., because it helps them sorting job candi-
dates more efficiently), students value the signal as well and are thus willing
to pay to acquire it. In addition, the value of the signal increases with the
reputation of the institution delivering the degree. Higher education insti-
tutions therefore monetize the value that they create on the job market by
reducing the information asymmetry that plagues the recruitment process.
MOOC platforms try to emulate this model but with two major differ-
ences. First, MOOCs still suffer from a reputation deficit with respect to
traditional institutions. So far, the certificates that they deliver are not
accredited by any external quality assurance institution; the only form of
accreditation comes, indirectly from the reputation of the professors who
15For other analysis of the revenue models of MOOCs and of other freely available
educational resources see, e.g., Downes (2007) and Dellarocas and Van Alstyne (2013).
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conceive the MOOCs and of the universities that employ them. Second,
and more importantly, MOOCs turn the certification model on its head in
terms of pricing. In the traditional model, the institutions charge students
(and/or the subsidizing public authorities) upfront for the access to a pro-
gram of courses; the degree is then delivered, free of charge, when students
successfully complete the program. The exact opposite applies for MOOCs:
access to courses is free but students need to pay if they want to obtain a
certificate that attests of their successful learning experience. Clearly, the
main drawback to this approach is that revenues depend not on enrollment
figures but on completion rates (and on the value that those students who
complete the courses attach to a certificate). For now, this drawback is seri-
ous as graduation rates for MOOCs are particularly low (especially relative
to the impressive enrollment figures).16
Facing this problem, MOOC platforms may be tempted to lower the min-
imum standards required for certification so as to increase revenues. They
may be able to do so because these standards cannot be perfectly observed
neither by students nor by employers.17 However, such tactic may backfire
as it may undermine the credibility of the certificates in the eyes of employ-
ers, as argued by Cantillon et al. (2011). The argument that underpins the
certification model would then work backwards: if employers doubt on the
signal conveyed by the certificates, students do not find it worthwhile to
invest their time to acquire them. Indirect network effects would also play
backwards: as students’ participation to the MOOC platform dwindles, so
does employers’ participation and so on so forth.
In sum, MOOC platforms seem to have a hard time to apply the certi-
fication model. The basic difficulty comes from the fact that MOOCs are
by essence open and free. As a result, platforms can only charge for the
certificate itself and not, as universities do, for the bundle ‘course + certifi-
cate’. Revenues then depend on completion and not on enrollment numbers.
Even though MOOCs are able to enroll many more students than traditional
higher education institutions, they suffer, for now, from much larger drop-
out rates. All in all, the quantity of certificates that MOOC platforms can
hope to deliver is likely to be small; moreover, students currently attach a
much lower value to MOOC certificates than to university degrees. To turn
the tide, a serious accreditation system should be put in place in order to
control for the quality of the MOOC experience; any efforts to consolidate
16Drop-out rates of around 90% are rather common. See U.K. Department for Business
Innovation & Skills (2013) for a discussion of the explanations of these high figures. The
most important explanation is that MOOCs are seen by many as an educational resource
rather than as a course. Another explanation is that MOOCs require a higher degree of
self-discipline.
17Certification standards are more easily checked for the command of languages or for
specific skills. This explains why tests like TOEFL or GMAT can be profitably admin-
istered by private organizations, whose core business is to certify (at the difference of
universities or MOOCs, whose core business is to teach and not to certify).
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the reputation of MOOC platforms and to improve completion rates would
also certainly help.
3.3. Freemium model. Freemium is a contraction of the words ‘free’ and
‘premium’, the latter characterizing a privileged offer. This approach builds
on the fact that some features of MOOC platforms are excludable. The idea
is then to apply menu pricing (i.e., second-degree price discrimination) by
proposing different versions of the service at different prices. Typically, a
free version (giving basic access to MOOCs) can be offered along a number
of paid versions (including various bundles of excludable services, such as
personalized tutoring, privileged interactions with teachers, unlimited ac-
cess to courses at any time, more flexibility in the use of the platform, etc).
The freemium model goes beyond menu pricing as the free version is not
just meant to identify users with a low willingness to pay, but more impor-
tantly to induce them to ‘convert’ to the paid version, whose value would
be revealed by the use of the free version.
Although this model has proven to be successful for many Internet-based
services (e.g., Skype or Spotify), some specificities of MOOCs cast doubt on
its replicability. Competition between MOOC platforms is quite intense as
platforms are not really differentiated (nor horizontally nor vertically) and
users face low switching costs. Costs associated with the paid services also
decrease the scalability of MOOCs (for instance, more tutors would need
to be hired). These two forces inevitably reduce the margins that can be
made from this revenue model. In addition, this will decrease the openness
of MOOC platforms while both professors and students derive value from it.
It is indeed likely that professors would invest much less in “MOCs” than
in MOOCs. If professors leave the platform, students will follow, leading to
further negative feedback effects.
3.4. Advertising model. The advertising model is one of the most pre-
ferred road to monetization in the Internet sector. The model can be sum-
marized as follows: platforms do not sell contents to users directly but only
indirectly, as contents serve to attract users, whose attention (and/or infor-
mation) is then sold to advertisers. Advertisers are indeed willing to pay
to attract eyeballs on their ads, and even more if they know to whom these
eyes belong. In this respect, MOOC platforms are of interest to advertisers
thanks to the information that they can collect about their users and the
large amount of time that students spent on the platform.
This model seems promising at first glance. However, it is important to
evaluate the extent to which advertisements can interfere with the learning
process and, possibly, discourage students. In the language of multisided
platforms, one would then say that the group of advertisers exerts a negative
indirect network effect on the group of students. The implementation of
such a system may also deter professors and universities from providing
content for free to the platforms. To keep them on board, MOOC platforms
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would then have to increase the compensation for their services, which would
inevitably raise the costs of producing MOOCs.
3.5. Job matching model. As for the advertising model, the job match-
ing model takes advantage of the presence of private actors around the plat-
form and the by-product created by MOOCs, i.e., the information about
its users. Asymmetric information problems are present in the labor mar-
ket: an efficient pairing between the two sides of the market is difficult to
achieve as employers lack reliable information about potential employees
and vice versa. As we already described it above, certification can reduce
this asymmetry. Other instruments are also available. Employers can in-
deed increasingly resort to new tools that allow applicants to demonstrate
their abilities and skills in a more coherent and effective way.18 It is in this
context that MOOC platforms can play a creative role. By continuously
monitoring the behavior of students, MOOC platforms accumulate big data
that they can use to improve matching on the job market. Such service
can be monetized on both sides of the market. By drawing an accurate
and multidimensional profile of their students, MOOC platforms can help
employers in their recruitment process. Platforms can also mine their data
to better advise students and help them to present their competences in a
more convincing way, thereby facilitating job placement.
Even if this model is attractive in theory, it raises many questions in
its application. MOOC platforms do not appear more likely than tradi-
tional higher education institutions to offer training programs that meet
the constantly changing needs of employers. Even if they may be better
at identifying students’ skills, the skills in question may not be the ones
that employers are mainly looking for. Guiding students in their job search
seems also far from their core business, namely education. Moreover, these
job matching services may also impair the scalability of the platform.
3.6. Subcontractor model. The models discussed so far involve indepen-
dent platforms connecting various stakeholders. In view of the difficulties
raised by the implementation of these models, MOOC platforms may prefer
to secure revenues by acting as subcontractors for either universities or pri-
vate companies. To universities, MOOC platforms can sell innovative ways
to deliver education, as well as cost savings. To private companies, they can
sell made-to-measure training programs. Let us explore the viability of these
strategies.
The first idea is to use some of the technologies of distance education
to complement traditional teaching methods, leading to a hybrid approach
also known as ‘blended learning’. According to Deslauriers et al. (2011),
online and live classes are complementary and, hence, their combination
leads to better learning outcomes. One way to achieve this is by flipping
18As Staton (2014) points out, “[e]valuative information like work samples, personal
representations, peer and manager reviews, shared content, and scores and badges are
creating new signals of aptitude and different types of credentials.”
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the classroom. Students get in touch with the class material on the online
platform before the class, and class hours are used to solve exercises, discuss
and deepen the material using the most of the professors’ skills.
In the second case, the MOOC technology is used to partially solve Bau-
mol’s cost disease (Baumol and Bowen, 1996). This phenomenon describes
a rise in salaries that does not respond to any increase in labor productivity.
It is typically observed in labor-intensive activities such as the education
sector. It can be explained by the fact that other sectors with high produc-
tivity gains (because capital can be more easily substituted for labor) have
to adjust the wages offered to their employees. To be able to keep and at-
tract a qualified labor, higher education institutions need to imitate them,
despite the lower productivity gains. As a result, the wage bill increases
with no counterpart in terms of production. As discussed by Bowen et al.
(2014), a judicious use of the MOOC technology could help improve the
productivity gains for teaching activities by (partially) replacing live course
materials by online counterparts. How this reduction in teaching costs can
happen in practice will be discussed in more details in Section 4.1.
Note that a prerequisite for these two strategies to be successful is that
universities accept not only to reform their current processes, but also to
delegate part of this reform to an outside contractor. Regarding the latter
point, universities may fear that MOOC platforms end up controlling an
essential input, and thereby acquire a strong bargaining position. A similar
situation happened in the second half of the nineties with the transition to
an online market for scientific publications that resulted into a price hike
(see Dewatripont et al., 2006). One can therefore understand the distrust of
academia to outsource the management of their own resources, educational
this time.19 In addition, universities must be willing to pay a sufficient
price to make this model profitable (which may be problematic as financial
resources are currently scarce in the education sector).
The third possibility would be to sell content to organizations and other
private actors that want to provide specific training to their members. How-
ever, this raises the question of the adequacy of the MOOCs offered on the
platforms (by professors driven by academic freedom) to the specific needs
of these organizations.
19Although MOOCs operate with the same multisided platform model as publishing
houses, the specificities of their respective markets make unlikely this kind of evolution.
First, compared with the market for scientific publications, MOOC platforms do not play a
certification role. Second, there exist potentially many substitutes for each course (online
or not). Third, collaborations between professors and MOOC platforms are still bound
by agreements between their higher education institution and the platform. Fourth, given
the large size of higher education institutions, they have a greater bargaining power when
dealing with the platform than a (or a small group of) researcher. Due to this, we can
think that market power is much less concentrated in the MOOC sector, making an abuse
of dominant position unlikely. These fears, however, could foster cooperation between
higher education institutions and intermediaries promoting a high degree of openness of
their platform as well as those with a not-for-profit status.
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In summary, we find that existing platforms still fail to cover their costs
with their own resources. This is so despite the fact that, up to now, plat-
forms do not have to pay professors to put their resources online. Hence,
platforms continue to depend on external funding sources. From this discus-
sion, the most promising way to monetize their business seems the subcon-
tractor model, potentially combined with elements from other models. The
reason is primarily technological: distance learning technologies are evolving
and become increasingly sophisticated, making it very complex to control by
an isolated academic institution (as rich and prestigious it could be). Out-
sourcing seems the only way to keep up with this changing environment.
The challenge for MOOC platforms is to profile themselves as collaborators
rather than competitors to traditional higher education institutions, a theme
that we further develop in the next section.
4. Implications for higher education institutions
In this section, we build on our previous analysis to identify how MOOCs
might impact the organization of the higher education system. We attempt
to formulate and motivate strategies that should be implemented by the
incumbent actors in the sector.
4.1. Complement or substitute? MOOC platforms and their technology
can have a significant impact on the functioning of higher education insti-
tutions. The precise nature of this impact will depend on whether MOOC
platforms appear in the eyes of their end users, namely students, as substi-
tutes or complements to the current traditional system.
On both sides of the labor market, there seems to be an increasing demand
for an unbundling of higher education, i.e., a relaxation of the time, location
and content constraints imposed in the traditional system (where students
have to follow a specific sequence of courses, in a single institution, during
a given number of months/years). In this context, the courses offered by
MOOC platforms can be seen as alternatives to those offered by traditional
institutions. Such a perception would lead to an increased competition in
the higher education sector, most likely to generate a positive effect on the
quality of the educational programs offered, and a reduction of the tuition
fees compared with the actual situation. The entry of these new players
could potentially affect the institutions that have not been able to adapt
their prices and programs to these changes. However, for this to happen,
a condition must be met by MOOC platforms: they must offer programs
that are seen, as (closely) equivalent to the ones delivered by traditional
institutions.20 In this regard (as we discussed above), neither their business
nor their pedagogical models seem to currently allow for this. Difficulties
to reproduce in a virtual environment the interactions among students and
20See Hoxby (2014) for an analysis of the impact of MOOC platforms on the higher
education sector whenever they are seen, at least by a share of the student population, as
a credible alternative to programs offered by traditional higher education institutions.
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with their professors, uncertainties about how to monetize their business
and a lack of pedagogical coherence are all factors that make MOOCs far
from being perceived, for the time being, as a valid alternative to traditional
programs.
Therefore, it seems more likely that MOOC programs and technology
become supplement to those from the traditional approach. This will tend
to strengthen the cooperative nature of the relationship they maintain with
higher education institutions. In this context, two types of use of MOOCs
are possible.
The first type highlights the possibility to diminish the capacity con-
straints of some establishments and to take advantage of scale economies in
order to enroll more students. For instance, universities may decide to ac-
credit some courses (or parts of courses) offered online by, or in cooperation
with, a MOOC platform. This strategy seems relevant for courses taught
in large auditoria where few interactions take place with the professor and
where congestion effects harm the learning process. A second approach con-
sists in offering, in cooperation with a platform, an online program taught
in parallel to a live counterpart but at a lower price. The success of such
a partnership, however, depends on the quality of the program and so, to
a large extent, on the MOOC technology.21 Depending on how successful
this additional program is, this approach could bring an additional source
of revenues for some universities (or help decrease some of their costs) and,
eventually, be a competitive threat for some higher education institutions.
A second use puts forward what the MOOC technology can bring to
higher education programs. More than a change in the higher education
landscape, this approach pushes for a pedagogical paradigm change towards
more hybrid forms of learning. The possibility to customize courses thanks
to new technologies and to give more frequently and promptly feedback to
the students throughout their learning process can contribute to the reme-
diation or the orientation of students at the start of their higher education
experience. This solution will not improve the financial state of traditional
institutions. However, it can improve the quality of the programs offered,
increase student’s learning outcomes and increase graduation rates.22
21Such an offer seems particularly adequate for lifelong learning programs as the un-
bundling made possible with online courses is highly valued by full time workers, who tend
to be less flexible and have a high opportunity cost of their time. Being more mature,
these lifelong learners will tend to be more self-disciplined.
22These two types of use correspond relatively well to the problems in the European and
American higher education systems. On the one hand, Europe needs to handle a capacity
problem caused by the massification of its higher education system without significant
additional financial help (from public or private sources). On the other hand, the U.S. are
confronted with increasing tuition fees for educational programs that do not always meet
the student’s expectations in terms of quality.
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4.2. Which strategies to implement? In this evolving environment, uni-
versities face several recurring issues. In order to define appropriate strate-
gies, it is of the utmost importance to understand the whys and wherefores
of MOOCs, and more generally of online education. Such a reflection should
lead to a greater professionalization of teaching activities, in a similar man-
ner to what has occurred throughout the last three decades for research
activities.
A first question concerns the supply of new technologies. Is it better to
produce them in-house or to buy them on the MOOC market? To answer
this question, the trade-offs brought forward by the theories of the firm give
us an interesting perspective. In-house production by higher education insti-
tutions allows for a complete control over the development of the educational
content and a protection of students’ data. The downside is that in-house
development of new technologies is very expensive and risky. It is expensive
because it is difficult to attract, and retain, such a specialized and highly
demanded workforce in universities (which lack both flexibility and financial
means, compared to the high-tech sector with whom they are competing). It
is risky because Internet technologies are changing at a very fast pace, which
only sufficiently large institutions are able to keep. Also, the comparatively
slow decision making process inside higher education institutions make it
complex to adopt a proactive stance, much needed in this quickly changing
high-tech environment. Given the technological and pedagogical uncertain-
ties in the absence of clear standards, it seems that market dependence is
the best solution at the moment thanks to the incentive effects that result
from market forces.23
A second issue relates to the research, development and adoption of these
new teaching approaches. The institution in charge of the pedagogical sup-
port for each higher education institution will see undoubtedly its impor-
tance enhanced. At first, it will, in collaboration with the Department of
Educational Science, conduct innovative research on the use of new tech-
nologies in the classical curriculum to develop new tools and promote the
emergence of new educational standards. In addition to the creation, it will
have the other objective, sometimes at odds with the first, to disseminate
these new approaches towards professors and students. For what concerns
professors, the strategies set to encourage the adoption of a new pedagog-
ical approach should take into account some of the peculiarities of higher
education institutions. Given academic freedom, their teaching approach is
largely voluntary. The high cost of learning to master new technologies and
developing new curricula can discourage professors given the other tasks that
they have to fulfill, and which tend to be more valued. Regarding students,
23An intermediate solution is to develop technologies via spin-offs partially or fully
funded by universities. The prominent example is Edx, which started with initial grants
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. However, these
institutions will still face the rude competition of other MOOC platforms.
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the role of the institution in charge will be to prepare them for this new
approach, as it requires from their side more initiatives and commitments.
A third important issue relates to the overall education policy at the uni-
versity level, which must be adapted to this new environment. The trade-offs
between research and education faced by professors is likely to be disrupted.
Given the difficulty to measure teaching practices and performances, the
important investment needed to be proficient with these new pedagogical
approaches might lead to a greater specialization in one of these two tasks,
as formalized in the multitasking model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
Hence, education tasks must be revalued compared with research tasks.
Pedagogical trainings in relation to these new technological developments
should be provided. To influence the career concerns of professors, the com-
pletion of these trainings should be taken into consideration for promotion.
This evolution should be articulated with a pragmatic improvement of the
students’ learning outcomes.
Conditional on these changes, traditional higher education institutions are
likely to keep their leadership position in the higher education landscape for
the years to come. Right now, the transformative potential of MOOCs seems
more disruptive for the internal functioning of incumbent institutions than
for the higher education market as such.
5. Implications for public policies
Given the potential benefits of MOOC platforms and their technologies,
higher education policies must play a catalytic role. At the local (regional
and/or national) and supranational level, governments must act to support
initiatives financially and to ensure an adequate transmission of information
on these issues. Several recurring questions will arise about the launch of new
platforms, new pedagogical approaches and the reform of the accreditation
system.
Like higher education institutions, public authorities must first focus on
the creation (or funding, recurrent or not) of new platforms. The differ-
ence is that public authorities have access to more funding and can take
advantage of larger economies of scale due to the higher potential number of
users. However, the absence of pedagogical and technological standards and
a lack of government expertise and reactivity on this subject make this type
of investment very risky. Three additional arguments may explain why the
development of new platforms will not or should not be a priority for public
policy. First, public funds may crowd out private investments in the MOOC
sector. Second, the public finance crisis may make an improvement of the
funding of traditional higher education institutions more pressing than the
investment in new technologies. Finally, the local nature of the public fund-
ing of higher education squares badly with the global benefits created by
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MOOC platforms, leading to free-riding and suboptimal investments.24 The
latter argument suggests that it is supranational authorities that should in-
vest in the development of MOOC platforms; yet, these authorities often
lack the necessary funding resources and the relevant competencies in this
field. In conclusion, despite the social desirability of MOOC platforms, their
public provision raises a number of challenges that appear as at least as wor-
risome as the those faced by private providers to find a sustainable business
model.
Even if they fail to provide public MOOC platforms, public authorities (at
all levels) may nevertheless play an important role in fostering the adoption
of innovative pedagogical approaches. Traditionally, when dealing with the
higher education sector, public authorities have been much more proactive
in the regulation of research than of education (and especially pedagogy).
Given the important benefits that could be reaped from the use of MOOCs,
this stance should be reconsidered. To design adequate policies, public au-
thorities should bear in mind how important is the independence of both
higher education institutions from governments, and professors from their
employers. It is therefore crucial to set up a system that will encourage,
in opposition to mandate, this pedagogical evolution. In this context, all
government levels need to consider how to finance and to regulate both the
creation and the dissemination of new pedagogies. In terms of innovation,
the creation of a scientific research fund dedicated to this purpose seems
relevant. In terms of dissemination, a framework should be established to
facilitate the emergence of best practices and new pedagogical standards.
This could be achieved by an institution whose goal would be to bring these
new approaches outside of the small circle of innovators. Ideally, these ini-
tiatives should be taken at the supranational level in order to favor the co-
ordination of a higher number of actors and the resulting greater economies
of scale. However, once again, the lack of competencies that supranational
authorities have on these matters might prevent them from implementing
these policies. Despite that, a clever use of their soft power can play a key
role.
A final important issue, which is directly related to the previous one, con-
cerns accreditation. A change of view will also be needed on this subject.
The lack of pedagogical coherence and standards make an accreditation of
the courses offered by MOOC platforms difficult, at least for the time be-
ing. Quality assurance agencies should avoid the pitfall of a too procedural
approach based on the inputs of the programs to establish a system reward-
ing learning outcomes. They should also fully play their intermediation
role between higher education institutions and governments. Through their
accreditation system, they need to encourage pedagogical innovations and
24As in the case where skilled workers are more mobile (Justman and Thisse, 1997),
jurisdictions will free ride from investing in education as they cannot take advantage of
the greater fiscal revenues derived from better paid skilled labor.
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the implementation of strategies to achieve this in every higher education
institution.
6. Conclusions
In the first part of this article, we introduced various economic and peda-
gogical concepts in order to understand the specificities of MOOC platforms.
Using these insights, we then discussed how the private provision of a pure
public good could be sustained. Five ways to monetize the MOOC business
were exposed using as a common framework of analysis: the theory of mul-
tisided platforms. We concluded from our critical but motivated appraisal
that there is no panacea but that the most sustainable approach seems to be
the subcontractor model, flavored in a well-balanced way by touches of the
other four models. We then claimed that these new actors of the higher edu-
cation landscape could play a key transformative role in the sector by making
teaching practices evolve, rather than by replacing incumbent institutions.
Finally, we derived a number of directions for public policy. Governments
should use their power of influence and their financial support to foster the
cooperation between MOOC platforms and other higher education institu-
tions, thereby improving the benefits that can arise from these technological
innovations. A particular focus should also be given to professors in order
to encourage them to innovate in their teaching practices.
By bringing together heterogeneous stakeholders, MOOC platforms are
an interesting object to analyze for economists. The economic concepts used
in this article have proved to be helpful to describe and to offer a tentative
solution to the coordination issues observed in the context of MOOCs. They
are also useful in highlighting the multiple informational problems at stake.
Theoretical concepts from industrial organization and economics of educa-
tion have clearly their say in this much talked about evolutions of the higher
education sector. In the near future, it is mainly empirical works that will
rank high on the economics research agenda. At the crossroad between edu-
cation sciences and economics, learning analytics testing education policies
in an online and hybrid context will flourish in the coming years. This will
clearly be facilitated by the abundance of new data collected on MOOC
platforms. We hope that this roadmap will inspire future research on this
topic.
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